French responses to the Prague Spring: connections, (mis)perception and appropriation

Looking at the vast literature on the events of 1968 in various European countries, it is striking that the histories of '1968' of the Western and Eastern halves of the continent are largely still written separately.1 Nevertheless, despite the very different political and socio-economic contexts, the protest movements on both sides of the Iron Curtain shared a number of characteristics. The 1968 events in Czechoslovakia and Western Europe were, reduced to the basics, investigations into the possibility of marrying social justice with liberty, and thus reflected a tension within European Marxism. This essay provides an analysis specifically of the responses by the French left—the Communist Party, the student movements and the gauchistes—to the Prague Spring, characterised by misunderstandings and strategic appropriation. The Prague Spring was seen by both the reformist and the radical left in France as a moderate movement. This limited interpretation of the Prague Spring as a liberal democratic project continues to inform our memory of it

Eastern Europe in the 1970s

The countries of the Soviet-dominated bloc in Eastern Europe have experienced important changes in the 1970s, collectively and severally. Having failed to establish an organic bond with its client states, the Soviet Union strengthened its hold on the area through the promulgation of the 'doctrine of limited sovereignty' sanctioned by armed force and engaged in an intensive military build-up in the northern and central parts of the European theatre. Soviet military presence in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary serves the dual purpose of buttressing Moscow's approach to East-West detente and policing the area under its domination. The suppression of the Prague Spring brought to an end an era of comprehensive official reformism which in the 1960s represented an attempt to remove inefficiency, and to attain moral legitimation. Substitute manoeuvres in the economy have been and are being tried but special precautions are being taken to prevent a spillover of economic experimentation into political institutions and processes. The economic pressures of the latter half of the 1970s, which are likely to continue into the next decade, may yet lead to renewed approaches to in-system reformism. The communist parties in the area have by now completed their evolution towards system maintenance ; the era of political and economic innovation within the Moscow-set limits is over. The leaderships, after three replacements of first secretaries early in the period (Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany), have maintained an equilibrium between 'ideologues' and 'technocrats' in their compositions. Aging of the leaderships has been observed, but it does not constitute the same problem as in the USSR. Material standards of the population have improved to the point where the lower threshold of affluence is within reach for large sections of the public. Having fully endorsed the policy of consumerism, the regimes interpret it as a source of legitimacy and a vital ingredient in the 'social contract' whereby political passivity is traded for material security. In the first half of the 1970s, under the combined influence of several factors, the economic performance was sufficiently satisfactory to sustain such consumerist, non-political orientation. The trend began to weaken around the middle of the decade, especially under the impact of the energy crisis. The old ills of command economy have once again affected economic stability and old-new tensions between performance and expectation re-emerged. After two decades of indecision and blind alleying in the Comecon, the 1970s have seen the introduction of intra-bloc economic integrationism, motivated-or so it seems-as much by the desire for political cohesion and central control as by practical economic requirements. In the framework of long-term 'target programs' to be pursued multilaterally by the Comecon, the most immediate 'integrated' activity consists in joint investment projects, mainly to extract and convey fuels and raw materials in and from the Soviet Union. While of doubtless benefit to the East European countries, these joint ventures cost them a great deal and reduce their domestic investment options. Normalization of relations with West Germany and a substantial increase in East-West trading are the two most tangible manifestations of the so-called detente in Eastern Europe. Importation of Western technology (but also grain by some countries) and the incurrence of large debts in the West have marked the end of the erstwhile notion that the communist and 'capitalist' economies would develop independently. While it cannot be said that the East European countries have become inextricably dependent on an in-flow of Western machinery, they do not seem to have progressed very far in acquiring a technological creativity of their own. From the middle of the decade, after some initial braggadocio, Eastern Europe has been badly hit by the energy crisis which created an almost irreconcilab

Commentaire sur « les aspects politiques des réformes économiques en Europe de l'Est »

The range of meaning of the term «reform» in the East European context extends from partial improvement to devolution of power and systemic change either on a technocratic or self-management level. There does not seem to exist any simple and direct causal relation between political and economic reform or vice versa, although the two obviously influence each other. Reformist attempts are motivated by «factors of change» generated within and outside the system, including a search for economic and political efficiency and relations with the outside world. The various experiences and theories — notably those of Yugo- slavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary — are in the process of coalescing into a general reformist policy which can be subsumed under the target heading of democratic socialism achieved through a peaceful transformation of the existing system.Dans le contexte est-européen, le terme « réforme » a une série de significations qui va de l'amélioration partielle à un transfert du pouvoir et un changement du système, que ce soit sur un plan technocratique ou au niveau de l'autogestion. Il ne semble pas exister de relation causale simple et directe entre les réformes politique et économique et vice versa bien que de toute évidence elles s'influencent mutuellement. Les tentatives réformistes sont motivées par des «facteurs de changement» nés à l'intérieur et en dehors du système, notamment la recherche de l'efficience économique et politique et les relations avec le monde extérieur. Les diverses expériences et théories — essentiellement celles de la Yougoslavie, de la Pologne, de la Tchécoslovaquie et de la Hongrie — sont en voie de se fondre dans une politique réformiste globale qui consiste à réaliser un socialisme démocratique par le transformation pacifique du système existant.Kusin Vladimir V. Commentaire sur « les aspects politiques des réformes économiques en Europe de l'Est ». In: Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest, vol. 6, 1975, n°1. pp. 99-105

Les millésimes de la Tchécoslovaquie

The Anniversaries of Czechoslovakia. The four major anniversaries of 1988 relate to radical social and political changes in the seven decades of independent Czechoslovakia's history. The Czechoslovak state was born in 1918, lost in 1938, transferred under communist rule in 1948, and it saw a reformist attempt thwarted by force in 1968. Every one of these changes was strongly influenced by external factors. Each resulted in a momentous upheaval in the social organization of society and the political culture of the Czech and Slovak nations. October 1918 is remembered both as the culmination of the process of nation building and as the event that ushered in democracy. September 1938 (the Munich Agreement), is recalled as a symbol of the weakness of democracy at home and in the West. February 1948 climaxed the evolution of Czechoslovak communism into an instrument of Soviet power. The Prague Spring and its suppression remain terms of reference in the present reformist climate. The discontinuity of modern Czechoslovak history, epitomized by the four anniversaries, reflects the predicament of Central European nations which developed and practised their statehood on the borderline between democracy and communism. The sequence of changes has not led to a satisfactory state of affairs and further sociopolitical reorganizations are on the horizon.Les quatre grandes dates, remémorées en 1988, illustrent les changements socio- politiques radicaux qui ont marqué sept décennies de l'histoire tchécoslovaque. L'État tchécoslovaque est né en 1918, a été perdu en 1938, a été soumis à un régime communiste en 1948 et à fait l'objet d'un tentative de réforme, éliminée par la force, en 1968. Chacun de ces événements a été fortement influencé par des facteurs extérieurs. Chacun s'est caractérisé par un bouleversement de l'organisation sociale de la société et de la culture politique des nations tchèque et slovaque. Octobre 1918 marque à la fois l'aboutissement du processus d'édification de la nation et l'instauration d'un système démocratique en Tchécoslovaquie. Septembre 1938 (Accord de Munich) est le symbole de l'affaiblissement de la démocratie dans le pays même et en Occident. En février 1948, le communisme tchécoslovaque se transforme en instrument du pouvoir soviétique. Le Printemps de Prague et son annihilitation restent des éléments de référence dans le climat réformiste actuel. La discontinuité de l'histoire tchécoslovaque moderne, résumée par ces quatre millésimes, reflète le sort malheureux des nations d'Europe centrale, qui se sont développées et ont vécu à la frontière de la démocratie et du communisme. Les conditions issues de cette série de changements sont loin d'être satisfaisantes et de nouvelles réorganisations socio-politiques sont en vue.Kusin Vladimir V. Les millésimes de la Tchécoslovaquie. In: Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest, vol. 19, 1988, n°3. pp. 9-22